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 AMATEUR REGULATION AND THE UNMOORED 
UNITED STATES OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC 
COMMITTEE 
Dionne Koller* 
In the wake of the USA Gymnastics sexual abuse scandal and 
Women’s National Soccer Team’s claim for pay equity, 
members of Congress have proposed legislation that would 
reform the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee 
(USOPC) through amendments to its governing statute, the 
Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act.  While an 
important step in the right direction, the proposed reforms 
fail to address deeper, more urgent questions about the 
USOPC, the sport National Governing Bodies (NGBs) it 
recognizes, and the meaning of the Olympic and Amateur 
Sports Act.  This Article explores those issues by explaining 
that the USOPC’s quasi-governmental nature means it is an 
amateur regulator—trusted to act in the public interest, 
consistent with its statutory purpose, but without the 
structure, funding, and institutional expertise of a federal 
agency.  Drawing from existing scholarly literature on quasi-
governmental entities, this Article explains that the USOPC’s 
status allows it to easily become unmoored from its governing 
statute’s original purposes and intent.  This Article asserts 
that proposed reforms to the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act 
must take account of this structure and suggests reforms that 
will create greater accountability to ensure that the USOPC 
better meets its statutory purposes and serves the national 
interest. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act (Olympic and 
Amateur Sports Act) provides a sweeping vision for the organization 
and administration of Olympic Movement1 sports in the United 
 
  *Professor of Law and Director, Center for Sport and the Law, University 
of Baltimore School of Law.  I would like to thank Liam Rhodes for outstanding 
assistance with research and Marc Edelman, Mike Harrigan and David Jaros for 
their helpful comments on drafts of this Article. 
 1. The “Olympic Movement” in the United States refers to more than simply 
Olympic and elite athletes.  It covers millions of children and young adults who 
train and compete on behalf of teams or clubs, and in competitions, that are 
sanctioned by sport National Governing Bodies. 
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States.  At the center of this vision is the United States Olympic and 
Paralympic Committee (USOPC).2  Congress granted the USOPC 
“exclusive authority” over all matters relating to U.S. participation in 
the Olympic Movement, including the power to recognize national 
governing bodies (NGBs) for sports ranging from archery to 
volleyball.3  The USOPC is not a federal agency, but a private 
corporation existing as a “quasi-governmental” entity—acting with 
the imprimatur of the federal government but with few of the 
accountability structures. 
The results of this structure have been mixed.  While the United 
States routinely tops the medal counts in the Olympic Games, 
grassroots sports participation is declining.  In addition, the USOPC 
has been plagued by scandal.  The most recent issues, involving the 
sexual abuse of hundreds of gymnasts by USA Gymnastics’ team 
doctor and allegations of discriminatory pay for the U.S. women’s 
national soccer team have spurred investigations, lawsuits, 
Congressional hearings, and calls for additional reform.4 
Both the USA Gymnastics scandal and U.S. women’s national 
soccer team’s wage claim raise important issues about protecting our 
nation’s elite athletes and treating them fairly.  Both issues also 
prompt deeper, and arguably more urgent questions about the 
USOPC, the NGBs it recognizes, and the meaning of the Olympic and 
Amateur Sports Act.5  This Article explores those issues by explaining 
that the USOPC’s quasi-governmental nature fosters confusion over 
the USOPC and NGB’s authority and obligations under the Olympic 
and Amateur Sports Act, allowing these entities to easily become 
unmoored from the statute’s original purposes and public 
expectations.  The USOPC and the NGBs it recognizes are in effect 
amateur regulators—burdened by the expectation that they are 
acting in the public interest, consistent with the purposes assigned by 
Congress, but without the structure, funding, and institutional 
expertise of a federal agency. 
First, this Article explains that the quasi-governmental nature of 
the USOPC means it is subject to limited judicial intervention and 
Congressional oversight.  This Article then explores the 
consequences, specifically that the USOPC limited its mission to focus 
 
 2. Until recently, the USOPC was referred to as the USOC, without the 
inclusion of the Paralympics.  For clarity, this Article will use the term “USOPC” 
even when referring to time periods when the entity was known as the USOC. 
 3. There are 50 NGBs.  Structure – National Governing Bodies, U.S. 
OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMM., https://www.teamusa.org/About-the-
USOPC/Structure (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
 4. Most recently, U.S. Rep. Diana DeGette proposed legislation that would 
require Congress to appoint a commission to study reforming the USOPC’s 
governance structure, and Sens. Richard Blumenthal and Jerry Moran sponsored 
the Empowering Olympic and Amateur Athletes Sports Act of 2019.  Empowering 
Olympic and Amateur Athletes Act of 2019, S. 2330, 116th Cong. (2019).  
 5. See infra Parts II–IV. 
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on winning Olympic medals, and it adopted a self-serving 
interpretation of the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act to avoid taking 
responsibility for the USA Gymnastics sexual abuse scandal.  Finally, 
this Article concludes by suggesting reforms that will create greater 
accountability and ensure that the USOPC better meets its statutory 
purposes and serves the national interest. 
II.  A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY 
The “amateur” quality of the USOPC’s regulation of the U.S. 
Olympic Movement can be traced to the USOPC’s structure.  It is a 
private corporation6 with high-profile, important public purposes: 
putting the best U.S. athletes on the international stage while 
developing grassroots sports.  The USOPC is what is known as a 
“quasi-governmental”7 entity, and literature on such entities 
explains, and indeed predicts, the types of issues that have plagued 
the U.S. Olympic Movement.  Due to a lack of meaningful 
accountability, the USOPC may easily stray from its public purposes 
and public expectations because it is subject to limited judicial review 
and Congressional oversight. 
A. A Private Corporation, Not a Federal Agency 
Olympic Movement sport in the United States was deliberately 
structured to be managed by the private sector and not the federal 
government.8  In 1975, President Ford established a Commission on 
Olympic Sports9 to study the reasons why the nation was not as 
successful in international competition as our Cold War opponents.  
The Commission concluded that the United States needed a central 
organizing body with jurisdiction to field the best athletes, though the 
Commission was “clear that it did not want the Federal Government 
running amateur athletics in this country.”10 
Congress responded with the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 
establishing the modern USOPC as a federally chartered, non-profit 
 
 6. Although federally chartered, the USOPC is not a government 
corporation.  See 5 U.S.C. § 103 (2018). 
 7. Congressionally chartered nonprofit corporations like the USOPC are a 
type of quasi-governmental organization existing at the boundary between the 
federal government and private sector.  Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at 
the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 855 (2014). 
 8. Dionne L. Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices Athletes’ 
Constitutional Rights in the Pursuit of National Prestige, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1465, 
1478 (2008). 
 9. Exec. Order No. 11,868, 40 Fed. Reg. 26, 255 (July 22, 1975). 
 10. Amateur Sports Act of 1978, S. REP. NO. 95-440, at 3.  For a discussion 
regarding the Commission’s paradigm while establishing the USOPC, see Dionne 
L. Koller, A Twenty-First-Century Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 20 Vand. J. 
Ent. & Tech. L. 1027, 1047 (2018).  
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patriotic corporation and not a federal agency.11  Congress granted 
the USOPC “exclusive jurisdiction” over “all matters” relating to U.S. 
participation in the Olympic Games. 12  The purposes of the USOPC 
include coordinating and developing athletic activities related to 
international athletic competition, obtaining the best athletes for 
participation in the Olympic Games, and developing grass roots youth 
sports.13  To do this, the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act provided 
that the USOPC would recognize privately incorporated NGBs for 
each Olympic Movement sport.14  Congress also granted the USOPC 
the exclusive right to use the Olympic trademarks to ensure the 
USOPC could fund its activities without government support.15  The 
USOPC is the only national Olympic committee in the world that is 
supported through the private sector and not the federal 
government.16 
Federally chartered corporations are created by statute17 and 
exist in the “twilight zone” between the public and private sectors.18  
The USOPC is what is known as a “Title 36 corporation” because it is 
not-for-profit and grouped in the United States Code along with other 
“patriotic and national organizations” such as the United Service 
Organizations and the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United 
States.19  Congress has created about 100 Title 36 corporations, and 
“it is free to draft corporate charters to include whatever elements it 
deems appropriate.”20  The USOPC differs from many other Title 36 
corporations in that nearly half are military-related and most do not 
have the same public profile and wide-ranging responsibilities.  The 
USOPC’s charge to develop grassroots sports, represent the United 
States in the international Olympic and Paralympic Movement and 
supervise the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Movement means it holds 
a position of public importance that the Society of American Florists 
and Ornamental Horticulturists (however worthy an organization), 
does not shoulder. 
 
 11. 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–29 (2012).  The statute is now known as the Ted 
Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act. 
 12. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(3). 
 13. See id. § 220503.  
 14. See id. § 220505(c)(4). 
 15. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 522 
(1987). 
 16. B. DAVID RIDPATH, ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF SPORTS DEVELOPMENT IN 
AMERICA 27 (2018 Ohio Univ. Press). 
 17. See KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22230, CONGRESSIONAL 
OR FEDERAL CHARTERS: OVERVIEW AND ENDURING ISSUES 1 (Apr. 19, 2013); 
O’Connell, supra note 7, at 855, 860. 
 18. KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30533, THE QUASI 
GOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE 
SECTOR LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS 6 (June 22, 2011). 
 19. KOSAR, supra note 17, at 3. 
 20. Id. at 4–5. 
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Despite being private, federally chartered corporations have 
engendered confusion because of their quasi-governmental status.21  
Federally chartered corporations are not government corporations, 
which are agencies of the federal government.22  A Congressional 
Research Service Report noted that while federally chartered Title 36 
corporations enjoy an “official imprimatur to their activities” along 
with the prestige and financial benefits that may result, members of 
Congress have expressed “concern that the public may be misled . . . 
into believing that somehow the U.S. government approves and 
supervises the corporations, when in fact this is not the case.”23  
Government entities operate with legal restrictions such as 
constitutional limitations, the applicability of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, and the Freedom of Information Act, among others, 
that do not apply to private corporations.24  In addition, federally 
chartered corporations are not managed or overseen by a government 
agency,25 and the supervision by Congress is “very limited.”26  
Federally chartered corporations such as the USOPC also do not 
usually have “government attributes” such as having their debt 
guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government,27 and 
they do not receive appropriations or exercise government power.28  
Because of the potential to mislead the public, Congress in 1989 put 
a moratorium on chartering new nonprofit corporations.  In 2009, 
Congress reaffirmed the moratorium, stating that “charters . . . 
falsely imply to the public that an organization and its activities carry 
a Congressional seal of approval.”  Congress also noted that it did not 
 
 21. KOSAR, supra note 17, at 5. 
 22. KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30365, FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS: AN OVERVIEW 2–3(2011); see 5 U.S.C. § 103 (2018); 
31 U.S.C. § 9101–10 (2018). 
 23. KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30340, CONGRESSIONALLY 
CHARTERED NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (“TITLE 36 CORPORATIONS”): WHAT THEY 
ARE AND HOW CONGRESS TREATS THEM (2011).  The Congressional Research 
Service Report goes on to conclude that “the chartering process itself tends to 
send mixed signals to the public.  Although the charter does not award any 
material governmental status to the nonprofit corporation . . . there is an 
understandable assumption on the part of the public that somehow the charter 
signifies U.S. government approval of the corporation’s activities and that the 
corporation is being supervised.  Neither assumption is merited.”  Id. at 13; 
Ronald C. Moe, Congressionally Chartered Corporate Organizations (Title 36 
Corporations): What They Are and How Congress Treats Them, 46 FED. LAW. 35, 
37 (1999). 
 24. KOSAR, supra note 17, at 5. 
 25. Id. at 6. 
 26. KOSAR, supra note 23, at 8. 
 27. Id. at 4. 
 28. Id. (stating that Congress “does not make these organizations ‘agencies 
of the United States’ or confer any powers of a governmental character or assign 
any benefits.  These organization [sic] generally do not receive direct 
appropriations, they exercise no federal powers, their debts are not covered by 
the full faith and credit of the United States, and they do not enjoy original 
jurisdiction in the federal courts.”).  
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have the resources to properly monitor such organizations.29  In short, 
the federal charter is honorific, and it confers no substantive 
relationship with the federal government.30 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized in San Francisco 
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee31 that the 
USOPC acts in the “national interest.”32  Justice Brennan wrote that 
the USOPC performs an important government function by 
representing the United States to the world and coordinating U.S. 
Olympic Movement sports.33  Although not a traditional government 
function, Justice Brennan explained that Congress endowed the 
USOPC with unique authority to serve an important governmental 
interest, and Congress put the “power and prestige of the United 
States Government” behind it.34 
B. Limited Judicial Review 
The USOPC’s “amateur” regulation operates with little judicial 
intervention.  This is by design, as Congress denied courts’ 
jurisdiction to hear claims falling within the USOPC’s exclusive 
authority.35  While the USOPC has the capacity to sue and be sued in 
federal court, Congress explicitly stated that the statute does not 
create a private right of action.36  Additionally, the Supreme Court 
has held that the USOPC is not a state actor,37 and several circuits 
have recognized an implied antitrust exemption for the USOPC and 
NGBs.38  The statute instead mandates that disputes be sent to 
binding arbitration.39  Courts have only recognized a cause of action 
 
 29. Id. at 2. 
 30. Id. at 4. 
 31. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 32. Id. at 544. 
 33. Id. at 550. 
 34. Id. at 559 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 35. Pliuskaitis v. USA Swimming, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1223–24 (D. 
Utah 2017), aff’d, 720 F. App’x. 481 (10th Cir. 2018).  
 36. 36 U.S.C. § 220505(b)(9) (2018) (providing that the USOC may be sued, 
but that any civil suit brought under the Amateur Sports Act “shall be removed” 
to federal court, and that “neither this paragraph nor any other provision of this 
chapter shall create a private right of action.”); Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic 
Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 594 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the “Act did not provide for 
a private right of action under which [Plaintiff] could seek to have those claims 
addressed by the district court.”). 
 37. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 
(1987). 
 38. See, e.g., Gold Medal LLC v. USA Track & Field, 899 F.3d 712, 713 (9th 
Cir. 2018); JES Props. v. USA Equestrian, Inc., 458 F.3d 1224, 1230–31 (11th 
Cir. 2006); Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass’n, 213 F.3d 198, 204 (5th 
Cir. 2000). 
 39. 36 U.S.C. § 220522(a)(4) (2018).  Congress also explicitly prohibited 
courts from taking jurisdiction to grant an injunction allowing an athlete to 
compete in the Olympic Games within twenty-one days of the start of the Games.  
36 U.S.C. § 220509 (2018). 
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for individuals who allege that the USOPC or an NGB have failed to 
follow their own rules40 or for claims not arising under the Olympic 
and Amateur Sports Act.41  Most litigation against the USOPC that 
is adjudicated by courts is over intellectual property and infringement 
on the USOPC’s “exclusive” right to use the Olympic marks. 
This is not to say that the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act has 
not been interpreted by courts.  It frequently has been cited by courts 
as denying them authority to adjudicate eligibility and other disputes 
involving athletes, coaches and others who claim a right that is 
covered by the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act.  Thus, judicial 
interpretations of the statute serve to insulate the USOPC, not define, 
for instance, the extent of its authority over NGBs.  Those 
determinations and any others that might implicate the USOPC’s 
“exclusive authority” under the statute are settled through 
arbitration.  In addition, because the USOPC is not a government 
entity, it is not subject to the type of judicial review that attaches to 
a federal agency.  The Administrative Procedure Act, for instance, 
applies only to federal agency actions, including disputes over an 
agency’s compliance with its “authorizing statute.”42  That type of 
review is not available for the USOPC’s actions, so it enjoys near 
complete deference to its interpretation of the Olympic and Amateur 
Sports Act.  This freedom is tempered only by occasional 
Congressional oversight at times of scandal or crisis. 
C. Limited Congressional Oversight 
The USOPC’s amateur regulation also persists because of limited 
Congressional oversight. In general, Congress subjects federally 
chartered corporations to very little scrutiny. A Congressional 
Research Service report explained that  
it is not the intention of . . . Congress or the Government 
Accountability Office to ‘look over the shoulder’ of these 
organizations or to conduct audits on their own authority. 
Congress is understandably ambivalent with respect to these 
 
 40. Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass’n., 227 F.3d 1000, 1004–05 (7th Cir. 
2000); Harding v. U.S. Figure Skating Ass’n., 851 F. Supp. 1476, 1480 (D. Or. 
1994), vacated on other grounds, 879 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Or. 1995). 
 41. Pliuskaitis v. USA Swimming, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1224 (D. Utah 
2017), aff’d, 720 F. App’x. 481 (10th Cir. 2018); see also Shepherd v. U.S. Olympic 
Comm., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1074, 1088 (D. Colo. 2006); Lee v. U.S. Taekwondo 
Union, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1259–60 (D. Haw. 2004) (holding that Olympic and 
Amateur Sports Act does not preempt federal statutes prohibiting race and 
disability discrimination). 
 42. JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44699, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION 2 (Dec. 7, 2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44699.pdf.  In the case of a federal agency judicial 
review is calibrated to the level of deference, if any, courts should give the agency.  
Where courts have a role, that review is guided by the principles of Chevron and 
Skidmore deference.  Id. at 11–16. 
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chartered organizations; on the one hand it attempts to protect 
the public interest against abuse by those corporate bodies 
while simultaneously seeking to limit its involvement in the 
internal affairs of these private organizations.43 
Indeed, the usual tools of Congressional oversight are not available 
for quasi-governmental entities.44  For instance, with government 
agencies, Congress engages in the budget and appropriations process, 
which provides a check on agency action.45  Moreover, unlike 
government agencies, hybrid entities develop their own interests and 
generate significant political support and influence.46  However, while 
quasi-governmental organizations avoid the usual accountability 
mechanisms of federal agencies, they are often subject to political 
pressure.47 
This is the case with the USOPC.  Compared to other Title 36 
corporations, the USOPC has received a higher level of Congressional 
scrutiny.48  The Olympic and Amateur Sports Act requires the 
USOPC to submit a quadrennial report to Congress.49  Beyond that, 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
has taken the lead in investigating the USOPC at times of crisis.  
That Committee, along with the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee, investigated the USOPC and USA Gymnastics’ failure to 
prevent sexual abuse of athletes and released highly critical reports.50  
Yet despite these recent initiatives, the oversight of the USOPC 
generally has been through individual members of Congress with a 
specific interest in the Olympic Movement.  For years, this was 
Senator Ted Stevens, a member of the President’s Commission on 
Olympic Sports who took a personal interest in a range of issues 
involving the USOPC, from broad questions of whether it was 
fulfilling the grassroots sports development mandate to specific 
matters involving modern pentathlon and karate.51  In a 1995 
 
 43. KOSAR, supra note 23, at 9. 
 44. JONATHAN G. S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT 122 
(Robert E. Goodin et al. eds., 2003). 
 45. Id. at 39. 
 46. Id. at 173. 
 47. KOSAR, supra note 18, at 6. 
 48. See, e.g., KOSAR, supra note 23, at 5 (stating that “at least one of these 
nonprofits, the U.S. Olympic Committee . . . receives much congressional 
attention due to its high profile responsibilities.”). 
 49. 36 U.S.C. § 220511 (2018). 
 50. JERRY MORAN & RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, THE COURAGE OF SURVIVORS: A 




 51. See Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. 
and Transp., 104th Cong. at 179–181 (Oct. 18, 1995).  Indeed, Sen. Stevens’s 
interest in the statute and administration of the U.S. Olympic Movement not only 
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hearing, Senator Stevens expressed concern over whether the 
USOPC was using the authority granted by the Olympic and Amateur 
Sports Act to manage NGB issues, and noted that an “outside group” 
was needed to provide oversight over the USOPC, because “Congress 
won’t do it.”52  In one hearing that foreshadowed the same issues 
apparent in the recent USA Gymnastics scandal, Senator Stevens 
expressed concern that at least some in the USOPC did not believe 
they had authority over NGBs or the responsibility to, for instance, 
select a team for the Olympic Games.53  Senator Stevens presciently 
stated that “one defect in the law may be that there is not enough 
monitoring to make certain that these NGBs are really effective in 
carrying out their responsibilities.”54 
Congress also has exercised oversight in response to governance 
and doping scandals.  In 2003, Congress took steps to reform the 
USOPC in response to allegations of mismanagement and ethical 
violations, making specific recommendations to the USOPC to guide 
its reorganization.55  Congress also exercised oversight in response to 
the athlete doping crisis, spurring the USOPC to create the United 
States Anti-Doping Agency.  Congress subsequently took steps to 
prevent athletes implicated in a doping scheme from competing in the 
2004 Olympic Games.56  Beyond these moments of responding to 
scandal or crisis, Congress has not systematically reviewed the 
USOPC’s operations to ensure it was meeting its statutory mandate. 
III.  THE CONSEQUENCES 
Quasi-governmental organizations have been criticized for 
prioritizing private sector results over important public values.57  
Congress also has expressed concerns about such entities because the 
public may be misled into assuming that the federal government 
 
was apparent in the hearings he chaired (at least one where he noted he was the 
only senator in the room), but also with a dispute over the selection of the 2000 
Olympic Greco-Roman wrestling team. Sen. Stevens wrote a letter to the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to provide his opinion 
on the appropriate interpretation of the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act and 
which competitor should represent the United States in the Olympic Games.  See 
Lindland v. U.S.A. Wrestling Ass’n, 227 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 52. Amateur Sports Act, supra note 51, at 180–181. 
 53. Id. at 182 (Sen. Stevens explaining to USOPC officials what the “proper 
reading of the law” is with respect to the USOPC’s authority, and duties, under 
the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Does the U.S. Olympic Committee’s Organizational Structure Impede its 
Mission?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 22–25 (Mar. 
19, 2003) (statement of William C. Martin, Acting President, United States 
Olympic Committee). 
 56. Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action Doctrine’s Application 
to Amateur Sports, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183, 211–216 (2008). 
 57. KOPPELL, supra note 44, at 3 
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endorses or supervises them when in fact they operate outside of 
federal accountability structures.  The USOPC’s history and the most 
recent (and perhaps most troubling) scandals illustrate well these 
very concerns.  Without consistent, knowledgeable oversight of its 
activities, the USOPC modified its statutory mission, adopted a 
limited, self-serving interpretation of the Olympic and Amateur 
Sports Act, and prioritized medals over values such as athlete 
wellbeing.  It is, in practice, an amateur regulator. 
A. Modified Mission 
Hybrid, quasi-governmental organizations are less likely than 
federal agencies to effectuate the policy preferences of Congress and 
the President.58  In fact, such entities are incentivized to resist what 
they perceive as burdensome policy objectives because of the 
competing obligations quasi-governmental entities carry.59  This is 
the case with the USOPC, which has resisted the statutory purposes 
that, in its view, detract from its top priority of winning Olympic 
medals.60 
The Olympic and Amateur Sports Act effectively gave the 
USOPC a monopoly over Olympic Movement sports in the United 
States.61  As of the most recent amendment in 2018, the statute lists 
fifteen different purposes for the USOPC, five of which are directly 
tied to its relationship to the international Olympic Movement, with 
the remainder directed more generally to U.S. amateur sport.62  The 
USOPC is charged with establishing “national goals for amateur 
athletic activities” and encouraging the achievement of such goals;63 
“promot[ing] and encourag[ing] physical fitness” and the public’s 
participation in athletics;64 assisting in developing amateur athletic 
 
 58. Id. at 164. 
 59. Id. at 147. 
 60. See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, An Athlete Accused Her Coach of Sexual 
Abuse. Olympic Officials Stayed on the Sideline, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/olympics/an-athlete-accused-her-coach-
of-sex-abuse-olympic-officials-stayed-on-sideline/2017/02/14/35a6fc76-d2eb-
11e6-a783-cd3fa950f2fd_story.html?noredirect=on (“The law gave the USOC 
wide-ranging responsibilities, such as promoting racial equality, gender equality, 
and ‘sports safety.’ USOC leadership historically has taken a focused view of its 
missions, though. ‘For us, it’s all about medals,’ CEO [Scott] Blackmun said in 
2014.”). 
 61. Congress did not give the USOPC authority over intercollegiate sports, 
which are regulated by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).  36 
U.S.C. § 220526(a).  However, the NCAA must defer to USOPC policies when 
intercollegiate athletes compete in Olympic Movement sport.  Id. §§ 220505(c), 
220526(b). 
 62. Id. § 220503(1)-(14).  Congress added subsection (15) in February 2018. 
See Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization 
Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-126, § 201, 132 Stat. 318 (2018) (to be codified as 
amended at 36 U.S.C. § 220503(15) (2018)). 
 63. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(1). 
 64. Id. § 220503(6). 
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programs;65 providing “technical information” relevant to training, 
coaching, and performance, as well as supporting sports medicine and 
sport safety research.66  The USOPC is also required to “encourage 
and provide assistance to amateur athletic activities” for women, 
athletes with disabilities, and athletes “of racial and ethnic 
minorities.”67  Most recently, through the Protecting Young Victims 
from Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization Act, Congress 
expanded the purposes of the USOPC to include “promot[ing] a safe 
environment in sports that is free from abuse, including emotional, 
physical, and sexual abuse of any amateur athlete.”68  In 1998 
amendments, Congress expanded  the USOPC’s responsibilities by 
tasking it with the “same duties with respect to the Paralympic 
Games as it has with the Olympic Games.”69 
The USOPC’s mission is therefore highly ambitious.  In the 1995 
hearings, Senator John McCain questioned whether the USOPC was 
doing enough to develop grassroots sport, and pointed out that 
“Olympic leaders admit that the committee programs and emphasis 
are geared toward elite athletes and the pursuit of Olympic medals.”70  
USOPC officials stated that, while it recognized the importance of 
grassroots sport, “we cannot be all things to all people with limits on 
our financial resources” and that “[n]o other of the almost 200 
national Olympic committees in the world face the challenges we face” 
in having to both develop grassroots sport opportunities and elite 
athletes who will be successful in Olympic competition.71  In 
explaining the financial challenge of such a mandate, the USOPC 
stated that “our focus has become so wide that we can endanger” all 
of the USOPC’s obligations.72  The USOPC explained that without 
additional resources, it would be difficult to balance developing 
grassroots amateurs with its obligations to elite athletes.73 
 
 65. Id. § 220503(7). 
 66. Id. § 220503(10)-(11). 
 67. Id. § 220503(12)-(14). 
 68. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(15). 
 69. S. Rep. No. 103-325, at 5 (1998); Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur 
Sports Act, Pub. L. No. 105-225, §§ 220501–29, 112 Stat. 1253, 1465–78 (1998) 
(codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–29 (2012)). 
 70. Koller, supra note 10, at 1052 (quoting Amateur Sports Act; Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Com. & Tourism of the S. 
Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 104th Cong. 5 (1995)). 
 71. Id. (quoting Amateur Sports Act; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Affairs, Foreign Com. & Tourism of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & 
Transp., 104th Cong. 33 (1995) (statement of Leroy T. Walker, President of the 
United States Olympic Committee)) 
 72. Id. at 1052–53 ((quoting Amateur Sports Act; Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Com. & Tourism of the S. Comm. on 
Com., Sci., & Transp., 104th Cong. 34 (1995). 
 73. Id. at 1053 ((quoting Amateur Sports Act; Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Com. & Tourism of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & 
Transp., 104th Cong. 37–39 (1995). 
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Beyond simply limiting its mission to focus on elite athletes at 
the expense of grassroots sports, the USOPC developed a culture that 
limited its mandate to winning medals at the expense of other 
values.74  While Congress (and presumably athletes and the American 
public) assumed that the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act required 
the USOPC to safeguard athlete wellbeing, the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee found that the USOPC culture “prioritized 
reputation and image over athlete safety.”75  The USOPC’s limiting 
of its focus was achieved with at least the tacit approval of some 
members of Congress and little political backlash because, like many 
hybrid organizations, the USOPC has generated the political 
influence to “control its own supervision.”76 
B. Self-Serving Statutory Construction  
As an amateur regulator without meaningful oversight, the 
USOPC also interpreted the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act in a 
way that was uninformed at best, and deliberately self-serving at 
worst.  In response to the USA Gymnastics scandal, the USOPC and 
USA Gymnastics took the curious position that the Olympic and 
Amateur Sports Act prevented a more robust response to reports of 
sexual abuse of its athletes.  The USOPC further asserted in 
litigation, in response to a question about whether it had a 
responsibility to protect athletes, that the USOPC  “did not have 
athletes,” and that athlete safety and wellbeing were the 
responsibility of NGBs. 77 
Senator Stevens’s concerns expressed in the 1995 hearing were 
echoed in the recent Congressional reports that detailed the USOPC’s 
flawed interpretation of the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act.78  For 
instance, the House Committee found that the USOPC believed that 
athletes were solely the responsibility of NGBs, not the USOPC.79  
 
 74. Mike Harrigan, No Need to Amend Amateur Sports Act, SPORTS BUS. J. 
(Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2018/08/06/Opinion/Harrig
an.aspx 
 75. MAJORITY STAFF, ENERGY & COM. COMM., 115TH CONG., NASSAR AND 
BEYOND: A REVIEW OF THE OLYMPIC COMMUNITY’S EFFORTS TO PROTECT ATHLETES 
FROM SEXUAL ABUSE (Comm. Print 2018), https://republicans-
energycommerce.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/EC-USOC-Report-
12.20.18-Final-REV.pdf. 
 76. See KOPPELL, supra note 44, at 120 (identifying that quasi-governmental 
agencies may grow powerful enough to effectively pressure Congressional action). 
 77. Hobson & Rich, supra note 60. 
 78. JERRY MORAN & RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, SENATE OLYMPICS 
INVESTIGATION, THE COURAGE OF SURVIVORS: A CALL TO ACTION 6 (2019) 
(explaining that the statute required NGBs to promote athlete health and safety). 
 79. MAJORITY STAFF ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE, 115TH CONG., 
NASSAR AND BEYOND: A REVIEW OF THE OLYMPIC COMMUNITY’S EFFORTS TO 
PROTECT ATHLETES FROM SEXUAL ABUSE 6 (2018) [hereinafter ENERGY AND 
COMMERCE COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
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The Committee also found that the USOPC either did not know the 
extent of their authority over NGBs or believed that their authority 
over NGBs was limited.80  The NGBs themselves also did not fully 
understand, or care to understand, the Olympic and Amateur Sports 
Act.  The Committee Report stated that the NGBs did not believe they 
had any authority over their membership, because affiliated clubs 
that trained athletes were “private.”81  The Committee also found that 
there were inconsistent policies across NGBs and little oversight or 
enforcement.  The report highlighted the USOPC and NGB’s self-
serving, and inexplicable belief that they could not take action to 
meaningfully address sexual abuse of athletes because of the Olympic 
and Amateur Sports Act.82  Both the Senate and House Committees 
concluded that the USOPC needed to use their full authority under 
the statute.83 Similarly, one member of the President’s Commission 
on Olympic Sports recently asserted that the USOPC’s flawed 
response to the USA Gymnastics scandal was due to a failure “to 
understand” the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act and a failure to 
educate NGBs on the statute.84 
In 1995 hearings, Senator Stevens expressed concern that 
USOPC officials did not understand the USOPC’s authority and 
obligations under the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act.  The USA 
Gymnastics scandal, however, demonstrates that the USOPC is not 
properly incentivized to understand, and instead adopts self-serving, 
limited interpretations of the statute to avoid fully effectuating its 
responsibilities and mission. 
IV.  SHOULD THE USOPC BE SUBJECT TO GREATER OVERSIGHT?  
Scholarly literature on quasi-governmental organizations focuses 
primarily on accountability.85  The competing private and public 
interest goals faced by hybrid entities must be checked and managed 
so that these entities effectuate their full purpose.86  The USOPC 
illustrates these concerns, and after decades of scandals and uneven 
oversight, reform is once again on the political agenda.  The USOPC 
recently stated that it will move to submitting yearly reports to 
 
 80. Id. at 95–96, 101. 
 81. Id. at 97. 
 82. Id. at 7, 95–101.  In addition, in a USA Today survey, most NGBs 
reported that they did not have the power under the Olympic and Amateur Sports 
Act to punish member clubs that violate SafeSport bans by employing sanctioned 
coaches or administrators.  See Nancy Armour et al., Was Your Child’s Coach 
Banned for Sexual Misconduct? Better Check, USA TODAY: SPORTS (Dec. 13, 2018, 
7:05 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2018/12/13/olympic-sports-
scandal-coaching-kids-after-sexual-misconduct-ban/2196969002/. 
 83. MORAN & BLUEMNTHAL, supra note 78, at 6; ENERGY AND COMMERCE 
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 131. 
 84. Harrigan, supra note 74.  
 85. KOPPELL, supra note 44, at 164. 
 86. Id. at 165–66. 
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Congress.87  This is not enough.  To create meaningful change, 
Congress must consider reforms that produce more consistent, 
specialized oversight to ensure that the USOPC operates in the public 
interest.  This is not to say that the federal government should get 
into the business of developing Olympic athletes or selecting Olympic 
teams.  However, the USOPC’s quasi-governmental structure and its 
unique role in American life warrants a solution beyond the simplistic 
label that it is a “private” corporation.  Because there is no blueprint 
for quasi-governmental entities, Congress can use that freedom to 
create a plan for the U.S. Olympic Movement that benefits the nation 
and its athletes. 
The current proposal from the Senate Commerce Committee 
focuses on giving Congress the authority to dissolve the USOPC board 
or decertify an NGB.  These reforms, while a step in the right 
direction, would not do enough to address the accountability issues 
presented by a quasi-governmental entity such as the USOPC.  
Because the USOPC is not a government agency, it does not have the 
kind of contact with Congress that, for instance, the federal 
appropriations process requires.  In addition, Congress does not have 
the specialized knowledge.  Senator Stevens was able to provide 
unique leadership because he had been a member of the President’s 
Commission on Olympic Sports.  However, even with his knowledge 
of the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, his ability to provide 
consistent oversight was limited.  Today’s well-meaning senators 
have the benefit of committee investigations, but these investigations 
come long after harm has been done.  The committees also rely on the 
USOPC to provide insight into the meaning of the Olympic and 
Amateur Sports Act.  As discussed previously, these self-serving 
interpretations can be suspect.88  In addition, the drastic actions of 
dissolving the USOPC board or decertifying an NGB, by their very 
nature, are not likely to be used.89 
Instead, Congress should consider two possibilities.  The first is 
to create a sports “ministry” or similar government agency.  The 
United States is the only country in the Olympic Movement without 
a government agency to regulate sports, and a federal agency would 
certainly provide greater accountability and important leadership, 
especially for grassroots sports development.  The need for such 
leadership is discussed in the recently proposed National Youth 
Sports Strategy released by the Department of Health and Human 
 
 87. USOC Leader: Reform Possible with or without Congress, USA TODAY: 
OLYMPICS (May 22, 2019. 12:16 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2019/05/22/usoc-leader-reform-
possible-with-or-without-congress/39504551/. 
 88. See KOPPELL, supra note 44, at 119–21 (discussing the political influence 
of hybrid organizations). 
 89. These options are akin to withdrawing federal funding for institutions 
that do not comply with Title IX.  To date, none have ever suffered such a 
consequence, but many are not compliant with the statute and regulations. 
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Services.90  Besides likely not being politically feasible, however, 
management of the elite level of Olympic Movement sports need not 
be turned over to a government agency.  The use of private arbitration 
for sport disputes has worked well, and there is little argument for 
court involvement in these matters.  A federal agency aimed at youth 
sports, perhaps as a division of HHS, is the better solution. 
Another possibility is to assign a federal agency to oversee the 
USOPC.  An argument can be made that the USOPC is in effect a 
type of government contractor, with Congress granting the USOPC 
exclusive use of the Olympic marks as compensation for providing 
management of the U.S. Olympic Movement.  In such an 
arrangement, a government agency could be expected to oversee the 
management of the contract to ensure that the private entity was 
providing the services according to the government’s terms.  
Providing greater oversight of the USOPC to ensure management 
issues are being carried out consistent with Congress’s intent would 
not impede the USOPC’s ability to field Olympic teams.  The problem 
with this approach, however, is that it is not clear there is a federal 
agency that encompasses the variety of functions served by the 
USOPC.  While HHS would make sense for youth, grassroots sports, 
the USOPC’s functions within the international community arguably 
intersect more closely with the State Department.  Developing and 
selecting athletes for international competition does not fit neatly 
anywhere within the federal landscape, because, as the Supreme 
Court held, the USOPC does not engage in a traditional public 
function. 
Instead, Congress could create a new entity to provide greater 
federal oversight with the type of specialized knowledge that a federal 
agency would exercise.  The case law interpreting the Administrative 
Procedure Act provides a helpful analogy for such a model.  The 
USOPC should be given deference over athlete determinations and 
judgments directly related to USOPC and NGB’s sports expertise.  
The Olympic and Amateur Sports Act supports this, giving the 
USOPC broad powers to act independently in assembling U.S 
representation in international athletic competition.91  The USOPC 
should be given less deference, however, for matters related to 
management of the U.S. Olympic Movement and specifically 
regulation of NGBs. 
Other quasi-government arrangements provide useful examples 
for how the USOPC might be reformed to place it under greater 
 
 90. Exec. Order No. 13,824, 83 Fed. Reg. 8,923 (Feb. 26, 2018). 
 91. Numerous lawsuits have challenged athlete eligibility determinations or 
Olympic selection procedures, and courts have rightly declined to exercise 
jurisdiction to step into such disputes.  See United States Olympic Comm. et al. 
v. Ruckman, Nos. 09–4618 (FLW), 10–1252(FLW), 2010 WL 2179527, at *1–*3, 
*5–*6, *9 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010); Lee v. U.S. Taekwondo Union, 331 F. Supp. 2d 
1252, , 1254, 1256–59, 1269 (D. Haw. 2004). 
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federal oversight while also preserving the flexibility and autonomy 
that enhance its unique function.  For example, the Department of 
Agriculture and Department of the Interior are affiliated with adjunct 
organizations that are under the control of their respective agencies.  
The Securities Investor Protection Corporation and the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board operate as nonprofit 
corporations under the supervision of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.92  There is support within the U.S. Olympic Movement 
for just such a solution. Recently, the National Governing Body Task 
Force recommended “stringent” federal oversight of the USOPC.  The 
group suggested that a federal agency house the USOPC to provide 
more oversight and funding.93  At a minimum, Congress could design 
a type of “inspector general” for the USOPC to review its operations.  
Congress should use this moment of reform to seriously consider 
these options. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The aftermath of the USA Gymnastics scandal has made clear 
that in the USOPC’s interpretation, recognizing NGBs is far different 
from regulating them, and hoping that the USOPC will behave as an 
experienced, and not amateur, regulator when it was established to 
be a private corporation is unrealistic.  The USOPC has frequently 
told Congress that it cannot “be all things to all people.”  The 
expectation that it can be, however, goes back to the USOPC’s quasi-
governmental structure.  The Olympic and Amateur Sports Act 
establishes a private entity that is given a sweeping, yet unfunded 
mandate to act in the public interest.  With only market-dependent 
resources and lacking the management and accountability structures 
of a government agency, the USOPC and NGBs have acted as the 
private corporations that they are.  Simply put, they are amateur 
regulators.  The American public and its athletes expect, and deserve, 
better. 
 
 92. KOSAR, supra note 18, at 12–16. 
 93. NGB Task Force Recommendations (June 2019) (on file with author). 
